




CHINESE OPPOSITION TO SOVIET AFGHAN INVASION IS REFLECTED IN AID TO RESISTANCE

China has probably been providing military aid to the Afghan resistance since the December 1979 Soviet invasion. Moreover, Beijing has consistently taken a hard-line stance against the Soviet invasion. This position is intended to counter the spread of the USSR's influence, which is seen as part of a Soviet attempt to encircle China. By providing military aid, China hopes to strengthen the ability of the resistance to fight on and eventually force a withdrawal of Soviet forces. According to the Chinese, only firm military force can succeed in ousting the Soviets.

Diplomatically, China has repeatedly urged the US and Western Europe to provide coordinated support to the Afghan resistance. Outside support is seen as inadequate primarily because critically needed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and antitank weapons are not being furnished. During the 1980 UN session, China voted twice to condemn the Soviet invasion. Beijing has opposed plans to establish a neutral or nonaligned Afghanistan as well as any bilateral negotiations that might legalize or create acceptance of the Babrak regime. China's news media have regularly criticized the Soviets regarding their actions in Afghanistan while providing sympathetic coverage to the resistance effort. The Chinese also publicly urged international support, including arms shipments, to force a Soviet military defeat or at least a stalemate leading to a total withdrawal.

While the extent of aid is not known, China is providing a range of military hardware, including small arms, mortars, antitank mines, recoilless rifles, RPG rocket-propelled grenade launchers, antiaircraft machineguns, and ammunition. There have also been unconfirmed reports that the Chinese have supplied some SA-7/GRAIL hand-held SAMs.



Afghanistan

24. | China has been vehement in its denunciations of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In private, the PRC has repeatedly urged the US and its allies to provide military and other assistance to the Afghan resistance. Beijing continues to oppose propositions looking toward a neutral or nonaligned Afghanistan, in part because the accompanying negotiations would serve to legitimize the Babrak regime and in part because the Chinese believe that the Afghan insurgents must succeed on the battlefield before they can participate in the forming of any new government.

25. | China is known to be providing military assistance to the Afghan resistance, though exact quantities are unknown. There is some evidence that the PRC considered providing aid by way of the Wakhan corridor, but subsequently opted to channel aid primarily through Pakistan. Chinese arms for the Afghan resistance are known to have reached Pakistan by sea. Equipment provided reportedly includes small arms, mortars, antitank mines, recoilless rifles, antiaircraft machineguns, ammunition, and uniform items.

29. ¹ Antiregime groups in both Laos and Afghanistan are notably factionalized. Apart from arms, the PRC might provide the new insurgencies with propaganda and organizational support. While PRC influence among the Afghans will probably remain limited, there is room in Laos for a more assertive PRC role in organizing and coordinating the roles of various insurgent factions. Increased Chinese aid would probably be contingent on a more united Laotian insurgency. Such a movement might then be accorded the privilege of operating a clandestine radio from southern China.

27. : China's assistance to all insurgent groups will remain relatively low cost, in both financial and political terms. Monetary cost is important; in its official dealings with Pakistan, Beijing has emphasized that the economic pinch in China has had an impact on direct PRC aid to Pakistan, and that Islamabad must henceforth pay in dollars for military equipment previously provided on a grant basis. While it is unlikely that insurgent groups are being similarly dunned, the PRC's recent dealings with Pakistan suggest that the economic cost of military aid to all recipients will continue to be closely monitored in Beijing.

EXTRACT FOLLOWS




DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY

Weekly
Intelligence
Summary (U)

6 MARCH 1981

USSR - Eastern Europe



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
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The arms shipments arrive in Pakistan by both air and by sea. However, the Karakoram highway from China's Xinjiang Province to Pakistan, which is closed by snow much of the year, is not believed a primary means of transferring aid to the resistance. Moreover, it is not very likely that quantities of arms are being sent directly from China to northeast Afghanistan by way of the Wakhan Corridor. However, limited arms smuggling could be occurring.

The Government of Pakistan has been the intermediary for Chinese support and has also been in charge of actually delivering the weapons and selecting the recipients. This sys-



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tem is likely to continue unless the losses resulting from Pakistani corruption and inefficiency cause the Chinese to opt for direct delivery to resistance groups.

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Moderate Chinese military aid and strong diplomatic support is important to the Afghan resistance. While assistance is expected to increase, it will remain dependent on Pakistani cooperation.

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